Say of the Day: Don Rumsfeld

December 14, 2008

The front page of today’s NYT provides a thematic juxtaposition that is the stuff of a newspaper editor’s dreams: President Bush making a surprise, valedictory visit to Iraq (why, asks an only vaguely curious nation? for the customary pelting with shoes, of course), and an article summarizing Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.

Hard Lessons is the yet-unpublished official history of the chapter in Iraqi/American relations which opened as a “Mission Accomplished” banner unfurled to welcome the George the Conqueror to his minutely orchestrated aircraft carrier photo op. The lengthy report apparently chronicles all manner of waste, political manipulation, and general haplessness on the way to running up a $117 billion price tag, $50 billion of which came from the American taxpayer. Much of this ground was deftly covered by George Packer in his book The Assassin’s Gate. But I’m dying to read the report nonetheless, stamped as it is with the imprimatur of officialdom and with material derived form two more years of shenanigans.

With his “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns,” former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will likely emerge from history as an arrogant buffoon, sort of Robert McNamara with a bigger ego, if such a thing is possible. And even though Rummy was always good for a quotable column inch or so, he may deliver the biggest money line of his career in this report. Responding to the Jay Garner, the administration’s first Iraq viceroy, on the topic of the cost of Iraqi reconstruction, the Secretary was correct-sort of:

My friend, if you think we are going to spend a billion dollars of our money over there, you are sadly mistaken.

Exactly how sadly, we now have some idea.


Newsweek’s Cheap Trick

August 14, 2008

If you need any proof that it’s hard to sell magazines these days, look no further than the Newsweek cover currently on newsstands. It’s blazing red, with a strangely Soviet-looking picture of our President, and the uttlerly beguiling title “What Bush Got Right, by Fareed Zakaria.”

Ok, I thought, I’ll bite. I respect Zakaria. Maybe he’d found some deeper method to what I thought was simply the Bush administration’s unrestrained foregin policy madness.

How disappointing. At least on the state fair midway in my boyhood home of Kansas, when the barker advertised a two headed-chicken, the bird did indeed have two heads. Time’s trick is more like PT Barnum’s famous, “come see the egress.” Utterly no there there.

The article and the cover have almost nothing to do with one another, and Zakaraia says precisely zero that is new. What Bush got right, according to Zakaria, is that he’s completely reversed field on everything that matters, including his approach to each of the three members of the Axis of Evil (recently downgraded by State to “The Really Objectionable Threesome” in a briefing that got little attention). Zakaria bravely points to the fact that we are better off with the policy troika of Rice, Paulson, and Hadley than we were with Cheney Uber-Alles; he fails mention that the same could be said of Huey, Louie, and Dewey.

No, running this article under that title is like running the headline, “ What the Army Corps of Engineers Got right in New Orleans”, above a photo montage of ACE staffers loading sandbags onto levees. Shame on you, Newsweek.


Putin and the Pipelines

August 11, 2008

I’ve only read the first two chapters of Marshall Goldman’s Petrostate, but I’ve already learned plenty.

Like, the fact that the gas pipeline system in the former Soviet Union was designed by, well, Soviets. Consequently, there was no need to take into account whether a BTU of gas was coming from the Mother Country or a ‘Stan. It was still a Soviet BTU.

Fast forward to today. Now Gazprom owns all the pipelines, and the former Soviet states of Central Asia are, well, screwed. They have no western route for their product other than Gazprom pipes. On the other end, the countries of Western Europe have precious few non-Gazprom options (Goldman points out that 40% of Germany’s gas comes via Russia). The upshot: Gazprom makes 70-80% margins on the gas it gathers in Central Asia and sells in Western Europe.

That’s what I call leverage.


Multi-Polarity, Globosclerosis, and Realpolitik

August 2, 2008

What’s going on here? Admit it: it gives one pause to see David Brooks waxing Wilsonian in the New York Times:

But globally, people have no sense of shared citizenship. Everybody feels they have the right to say no, and in a multipolar world, many people have the power to do so. There is no mechanism to wield authority. There are few shared values on which to base a mechanism. The autocrats of the world don’t even want a mechanism because they are afraid that it would be used to interfere with their autocracy.

Before hitting send, Brooks might have done well to sample the Saturday musings of his soulmate to the West, George Will, writing on quite a different topic:

And no more locutions such as “citizen of the world” and “global citizenship.” If they meant anything in Berlin, they meant that Obama wanted Berliners to know that he is proudly cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitanism is not, however, a political asset for American presidential candidates. Least of all is it an asset for Obama, one of whose urgent needs is to seem comfortable with America’s vibrant and very un-European patriotism, which is grounded in a sense of virtuous exceptionalism.

Otherwise, “citizen of the world” and “global citizenship” are, strictly speaking, nonsense. Citizenship is defined by legal and loyalty attachments to a particular political entity with a distinctive regime and culture. Neither the world nor the globe is such an entity.

Then, in repsonse to Brooks’ piece, a bracing dose of foreign affairs realism from a chap named Daniel Larison, (see his terrific blog www.eunomia.com) filling in for Andrew Sulivan:

Officially, everyone solemnly intones that nuclear proliferation is undesirable and should be prevented, but the Iranian acquisition of nuclear technology does not appear to India or China as a threat. Their perspective as rising powers that have more recently acquired their own nuclear arsenals means that even an Iranian bomb seems far more rational and justifiable to them than it does to our government. At the same time, the real power and status that India has derived from its arsenal, such that our government has been trying to seal a nuclear deal with New Delhi in pretty obvious violation of the NPT, show every aspiring state that the way to be taken seriously by the U.S. is to possess this sort of power.

What a multipolar world really shows is the limits of multilateral institutions. During most of the Cold War, the U.N. did not provide much in the way of collective security because the member states were either divided between the two superpowers or organized under the Non-Aligned Movement, and after the Cold War the U.N. was able to provide meaningful collective security only when the remaining superpower backed the action. Now that there are multiple new powers emerging in the world, the multilateral framework, which presupposes a consensus that will almost never exist among so many divergent interests, has been breaking apart. This has been exacerbated by the consistent targeting of Russian and Chinese satellites for sanctions and attack, while leaving U.S. allies that have their own egregious records unscathed, but these are simply symptoms. The problem, if you want to call it that, is that the artificial and unusual disparity of power between the U.S. and the rest of the world that occurred in the wake of WWII has been steadily narrowing, and it will continue to do so. This is essentially a return to something more like a normal state of affairs after the extremely abnormal 20th century.

Of course, both of these guys have a point. Larison is pretty impossible to argue with when he says, essentially, “multi-polarity means a greater diversity of irreconcilable self-interests, so get over it.” And as he notes, the collapse of the Doha round makes a fine Exhibit A.

But he goes too far in introducing the idea that because the 20th century was a historical exception, we should be comfortable returning to a 19th century posture of “every man for himself.” Unfortunately, easily the greatest source of the 20th century’s exceptionalism is that it has produced the seeds of the planet’s sudden annihlation, and those seeds are now in their seventh decade of germination and spread. Ok that sounds a little overwrought, but it’s also not wrong.

Nuclear non-proliferation-which amazingly, has received precisely *no* air time in the U.S. Presidential campaign-*must* be foreign policy job #1 for every responsible nation. And anything other than the broadest-based multi-laterilism won’t get job #1 done. To say that China sympathizes with Iran’s nuclear aspirations has much basis in fact. But I sympathize with my labrador’s desire to eat the whole bag of chow. I don’t let her do it, because there will be consequences to her and to me which are far more predictable than the consequencs to China of a nuclear-armed Iran.

In Michael Dobbs’ new Book, One Minute to Midnight, (highly recommended, btw) he recounts an episode during the Cuban missile crisis when the pilot of a single-seat F-106 airplane muffed his landing at a foggy Terre Haute airstrip and skidded off the runway. This would have been the 19th century equivalent of falling off a horse, except that the plane had in its hold a 1.5 kilo-ton nuclear war head, about a tenth the size that was dropped on Hiroshima. And then there’s the one about the sub that got away: U.S. forces tried madly but in vain to track down and force to surface a Soviet submarine which had been escorting two vessels toward the quarantine line. That the sub was never located was fortunate: it was packing a nuclear tipped missile and piloted by a captain under orders to use it.

And all this, nearly 50 years ago. God only knows how many near-misses there have been since.

No, the “new” international order has as much in common with the geopolitics of another planet as it does with those of the 19th century, with the proliferation of of nukes being the game changer. If there is one use for a multilateral institution with real teeth, nuke non- prolif is it. The details of such body are well above my pay grade. But the next POTUS can’t afford to say the same thing.